It’s often tough to talk about historical topics these days because people aren’t really speaking the same language anymore. Media and the education system don’t do a good job equipping the public with the fundamental background knowledge it needs. Oftentimes, smart people without any bad intent just don’t know about important events, or have such a narrow understanding of those events that it’s tough to put any new information they learn in context.
The results of this lack of general knowledge are what I like to call “islands.” Little factoids or anecdotes that might have some degree of truth to them, but, lacking background information to serve as connective tissue, can end up painting a very misleading picture. People accumulate different islands based on the media they consume or whatever topics they’re interested in. That’s only natural, different people are going to be interested in different things, but it doesn’t lead to very productive discussions. It often seems like people are just exchanging anecdotes with each other. They might agree, they might disagree, but inevitably not a lot is gained. History turns into a mere checklist to be deployed in a Discord argument.
I’ve decided to write this brief summary of the Russian Revolution just so that readers of this Substack, at least, can understand where I’m coming from when I post about one of my main areas of interest: The Russian Civil War (1917-1921). I was inspired to do this after I wrote a summary of the Kuban Ice March for a post that reproduced a 1918 pamphlet describing that event and the early development of the anti-communist White Army.
Historical documents are tricky because, even if the documents are interesting, the authors (understandably) assumed that readers would know about things that, 100+ years later and several continents away, they don’t necessarily know about. Even a bit of background knowledge can add a lot to peoples’ understanding of these documents.
Some notes on this essay: I’m not trying to write a comprehensive history of the period or provide details on all aspects of Russian political life. I will be writing a few of these summaries over the next few months and I have a vague plan to introduce other subjects when they’re more relevant to the main drama. For instance, I don’t mention the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Kadets, the Menshiviks, or other major political players in pre- and post-Revolution Russia in this essay. They’re all important, I’ll bring them up later, but my main goal here is to create an accessible narrative that the average person walking off the street can understand without much background knowledge.
I’m not a professional historian, I work in marketing and dropped out of a film studies program in Canada after one semester, but I do read a lot of this stuff. If you’re looking for a more in-depth examination of the Russian Revolution, I strongly recommend Sean McMeekin’s book The Russian Revolution: A New History. That is, without a doubt, the best summary of these events out there. It’s very well-written and easy to understand. Everyone should read it.
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And now, to the essay:
Although popular histories often refer to a singular “Russian Revolution” that destroyed the Russian Empire, there were actually two major political shifts that occurred in the cataclysmic year of 1917.
The first of these was the February Revolution. Russia mobilized millions of conscripts to fight in World War I against Germany and its allies (collectively known as the Central Powers). Although Russia’s military performance during that war was not as dismal as it is often made out to be, the societal pressure caused by mass conscription, wartime shortages (both real and imagined), and well-funded propaganda operations sponsored by the German, British, and Japanese governments (the latter two, even though they were members of the Allied Powers with Russia in WWI, saw Russia as a major geopolitical rival) culminated in a massive loss of confidence in Russian monarch Czar Nicholas II’s ability to govern.
This loss of confidence climaxed in February of 1917. What followed were enormous and endless riots in major cities that the Russian police and military were unable and eventually unwilling to control. Seemingly abandoned by his allies and even some members of the Royal Family (Grand Duke Kirill, the Czar’s first cousin, actually moved his troops away from guarding Czarina Alexandra so that they could swear loyalty to “the Revolution”), Czar Nicholas abdicated his throne.
Czar Nicholas first planned to hand power to his son Alexis (only 12 years old), as the Imperial rules of succession dictated. However, at the last minute, Czar Nicholas decided to instead pass the throne to his younger brother, the popular Grand Duke Michael. Although Nicholas thought this would calm the situation, this deviation from standard constitutional procedures only dumped fuel on the fire. Grand Duke Michael (who had liberal sympathies) refused to accept power, instead turning it over to the Constituent Assembly, the parliment that had formed after the Revolution.
Henceforth, Russian monarchy and Imperial system was replaced by the Provisional Government, an impromptu parliamentary democracy dominated by the major political factions that drove the Revolution. The Provisional Government was headquartered in the Winter Palace, the former residence of the Royal Family. Czar Nicholas and many of his relatives were imprisoned without charges by the new government and held captive. Although the assumption was that Czar Nicholas would be allowed to go into exile in England, British King George V (a close relative of Czar Nicholas) eventually withdrew his offer of asylum, afraid of political backlash from British liberals (including the relatively new and ascendant Labor Party).
Later attempts to exile the royal family were blocked by the emerging power of the Soviets, public workers’ councils that frequently passed decrees that held competing authority with the Provisional Government’s orders. These decrees were largely enforced by mob violence and the threat of shutdowns to critical infrastructure. The largest and most influential Soviet was in the capital Petrograd (usually called St. Petersburg, which had been renamed at the start of World War I over concerns that the city’s name sounded too German). Grand Duke Michael himself was arrested without charges by the Provisional Government as the political situation deteriorated further. Grand Duke Kirill fled the country, abandoning everyone to their fates.
The Provisional Government left much to be desired. The disorder that had toppled the Czar did not end, it only accelerated. Political infighting and petty factional disputes paralyzed the operations of the already-unwieldly Russian state bureaucracy. Making matters worse, the Russian military (which was then still engaged in fierce combat on the frontlines of WWI) began to collapse. This collapse was both due to the general climate of hysteria that prevailed in Russia at the time and dubious “reforms” introduced by the Provisional Government and the Soviets.
Examples of changes to the Russian military forced by the Provisional Government and the Soviets included banning the death penalty in all cases, forbidding traditional military honorifics and saluting, banning signs of rank and unit insignias (which made preventing desertion, then an epidemic, effectively impossible), the introduction of political commissars who could override officers’ orders, and the creation of numerous soldiers’ committees which held frequent democratic referendums on matters essential to military life.
Morale and discipline in the Russian military were immediately destroyed. Men refused orders and frequently assassinated their officers. Millions of conscripts returned home with their weapons to an uncertain future. Basic governmental functions and the fundamentals of economic life began to break down as a growing state of anarchy and hysteria gripped the population.
Seeking support from abroad, the Provisional Government redoubled Russia’s military commitment to the Allied Powers in World War I, which was still raging as Russia entered a state of political collapse. Lavr Kornilov, the only Russian general to have a major victory in the months that followed the February Revolution, became one of the senior leaders of the Provisional Government’s military forces. Although Kornilov had supported the February Revolution, he was still respected in conservative circles. He was widely regarded as a hard-charging officer and was openly hostile to the “reforms” that had crippled the military.
Working with Alexander Kerensky, an outspoken attorney who had become the Provisional Government’s War Minister through dubious political maneuvering, Kornilov began to roll back some of the more destructive policies forced onto the military. Kerensky and Kornilov worked together to organize the “Kerensky Offensive,” a massive military advance that was intended to restart Russia’s momentum on the (then collapsing) Eastern Front against the Central Powers (Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Turkey). Kerensky made himself the central figure of the narrative surrounding the offensive, often visiting the frontlines to speak to the troops about the need to protect Russia’s “Revolutionary Democracy.”
When the Kerensky Offensive finally began in June 1917, it was a near-immediate disaster. Russian troops were simply too demoralized and refused to fight in large numbers after they had left their trenches. As the Germans and Austrians counter-attacked, the Kerensky Offensive quickly turned into a rout for Russia. The Central Powers advanced almost without opposition deeper into Russian-controlled territory and the Provisional Government was discredited.
The Bolsheviks, a small communist political party that had risen to prominence after being gifted large amounts of cash by German intelligence as part of an effort to remove Russia from the war, plotted to overthrow the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks controlled, or at least heavily manipulated, many of the Soviets in major cities, and frequently staged violent demonstrations and attacks on rivals. Although the Bolsheviks did not have buy-in from a large swath of Russian society, they did have the support of many rebellious soldiers and sailors, particularly those in Petrograd. One of the key distinctions between the Bolsheviks and other political parties was the Bolshevik promise to withdraw from the war immediately.
The Provisional Government’s ruling coalition collapsed in early July over both the humiliations of the Kerensky Offensive and continued disputes over the autonomy of the provinces that made up the Ukraine (it was called that back then), which was then considered a part of Russia. The Prime Minister and other cabinet officials announced their resignations.
During the July Days, the Bolsheviks’ supporters (possibly without the approval of the central party) held massive armed marches throughout Petrograd. They attacked passersby, stormed private homes, and seized vehicles and strategic points. The violence exceeded that of the February Revolution in many areas. They also attempted to force the Soviets (which, although they were heavily influenced the Bolsheviks, also had significant numbers of members of other leftwing parties) to formally launch a coup against the Provisional Government. The Soviets waffled and eventually Bolshevik Party leader Vladimir Lenin himself disavowed the attempted takeover.
This disavowal came too late, however. Public opinion shifted decisively against the Bolsheviks, who were machinegunned in the streets by loyalist troops without much backlash. Many prominent Bolsheviks, including Petrograd Soviet chairman Leon Trotsky, were arrested and Lenin had to flee the country.
Kerensky used the opportunity to rise to the top of the Provisional Government, becoming Prime Minister. He made Kornilov Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the military, banned public demonstrations, and took other steps to restore stability to Russia. This stability was short-lived, however, as Kerensky’s political ambitions far exceeded his abilities. Styling himself as a Napoleon-esque figure committed to saving liberal democracy by any means necessary, Kerensky made blunder after blunder and united nearly all factions on the Left and the Right against him.
These blunders eventually came to a head in September 1917 during an incident that would become known as the Kornilov Affair. Kerensky had requested that Kornilov prepare a special detachment of troops to “restore order” in Petrograd. This likely entailed liquidating the Petrograd Soviet by force after its many months of disruptions and open revolutionary activity. Russian life had turned into a never-ending hostage situation, directed by the whims of the Soviets. The troops assembled to crush the Petrograd Soviet were to be led by General Krymov.
However, a former government minister named V. N. Lvov presented himself Kornilov, falsely claiming to be an emissary of Kerensky. Although Lvov was well-connected in conservative circles, he was regarded as an unstable character. He had been snubbed by Kerensky months before, failing to receive an expected cabinet appointment. Lvov learned that Kornilov wished for even more aggressive state crackdown on revolutionary disorder and, without any authority from the Provisional Government, asked Kornilov what would entice Kornilov to begin a temporary military dictatorship with the permission of the Provisional Government.
Lvov then travelled to Kerensky and falsely claimed to be an emissary of Kornilov. He presented Kornilov’s hypothetical conditions for accepting a temporary military dictatorship from the Provisional Government as though they were a list of Kornilov’s demands to Kerensky. The meeting did not go well. Lvov threatened Kerensky’s life and falsely claimed that a military coup led by Kornilov was imminent.
Kerensky, rather than reaching out to Kornilov directly about these claims, began to impersonate Lvov in a series of vague communications to Kornilov and other military leaders. After receiving confused answers in response, Kerensky publicly declared that Kornilov was attempting a coup and ordered his arrest.
In response, Kornilov ordered Krymov’s troops to advance on the capital and proceed with the planned liquidation of the Petrograd Soviet. It’s unclear why he gave this order. It’s possible that Kornilov was actually attempting to overthrow the Provisional Government after learning of Kerensky’s proclamation. It’s also possible that he believed that this seemingly unprovoked move to arrest him was actually a sign that a leftwing coup led by either the Soviets or the Bolsheviks was already in progress.
Whatever the reason for Kornilov’s order, Krymov’s force lost momentum as it approached the capital. Many troops refused to proceed with what they believed was a military coup and there was frequent sabotage of telegraph and rail lines, contributing to the confusion.
In a last-ditch effort to “defend” Petrograd, Kerensky ordered that all the Bolsheviks who had been arrested following the July Days be released from prison and freely handed out heavy weapons to anyone who would take them in Petrograd. These weapons were not returned after the crisis ended.
Krymov and a small escort travelled ahead of the main force to meet with Kerensky and negotiate, or at least obtain some clarity as to what was actually happening. After the meeting with Kerensky, Krymov shot himself for unclear reasons.
Kornilov voluntarily surrendered and was replaced as the head of the Russian military by General Mikhail Alexeiev (who had personally arrested Kornilov, leading to lifelong bad-blood between the two men). Complicating matters was the fact that many conservative officials and military leaders mistakenly believed that Kornilov had actually been planning a coup, and came out in support of a Kornilov-led military dictatorship to end the disastrous reign of the Provisional Government. Kornilov and other military leaders who supported the alleged rebellion, such as General Anton Denikin, were imprisoned (by troops who sympathized with them) at Bykhov Fortress.
Although Kerensky had managed to save the Provisional Government, which might have never been under real threat, the months of chaos had thoroughly discredited him and it. The Bolsheviks, released from prison and without the fear of interference from conservative military officers (who, if they weren’t jailed, were thoroughly disorganized), redoubled their efforts to topple the Provisional Government. Lenin returned from exile and he and Trotsky began laying the groundwork for a coup to be held the following month in October.
Plans for the Bolshevik coup leaked publicly. However, rather than take action against the Bolsheviks, Kerensky instead adopted a policy of “No enemies to the left” and began further (increasingly dubious) suppression of conservative officers and political associations in an attempt to ingratiate himself with leftist parties and remove any motivation for a coup. Several newspapers were ordered shuttered. Kerensky also announced the formal dissolution of the monarchy and the Provisional Government, replacing it with the (very short-lived) Russian Republic.
As Bolshevik men and arms flowed freely into Petrograd, numerous factions and organizations attempted to halt the obviously-imminent overthrow of the government. Loyal soldiers stormed and destroyed a pro-Bolshevik newspaper printing facility. One night, a group of officers, apparently organized by high-level members of the government, surrounded the Smolny Institute, which the Bolsheviks had taken as their headquarters, and planned to kill everyone inside. However, they were never given the “Go” order and the group soon disbanded.
On October 25, 1917, the Bolsheviks launched their coup in Petrograd. It was known as the October Revolution. There was relatively little fighting. Few people were willing to defend the Kerensky government, particularly against the overwhelming odds that had been assembled by the Bolsheviks in the city. Nearly all of the local military garrison supported the coup. A Bolshevik naval flotilla entered the Neva river (which runs through Petrograd) and began to bombard the Winter Palace, which was soon stormed and captured. Virtually every member of Kerensky’s government was taken prisoner or killed except for Kerensky, who fled the capitol building in disguise without warning anyone of his departure.
Escaping the Winter Palace by car, Kerensky travelled outside the city until he found a loyal garrison. Although this force gained some ground initially, they soon encountered fierce opposition and, realizing how outnumbered they were, scattered. Kerensky fled Russia for good, never to return.
The coup was almost entirely successful, though some fighting between the Bolsheviks and forces loyal to the old government continued in Moscow as well as a few areas that lacked a significant Bolshevik presence. The Bolsheviks and the Soviets announced the creation of a new government for Russia, a Soviet Republic. This new Bolshevik government had no legal authority and was not recognized by any other political party in Russia. The grim shadow of civil war soon fell over the country.
But that is another story.
I wrote a follow-up to this article that describes the months that followed the October Revolution, as the Bolsheviks tried (and often failed) to solidify their power. You can read that article here.
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Good intro! McMeekin is great and thank you for mentioning his wonderful book! A few other great primary secondary sources to check out:
Samuel Harper's: The Russia I Believe in
David Francis ambassador's diaries from 1916-1918
Malcolm Muggeridge's Chronicles of Wasted Time
I have done a very deep dive on this and I'm not gonna lie, I found a lot of these books via Yarvin's substack. He has some other books on the Siberian Expedition from the general Graves, The Raymond Robins hagiography, Sorokin's memoir on this era, Anthony Sutton's The Bolsheviks and Wall Street, as well as Herbert Hoover's book The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson which really flesh out his thesis. This thesis really just proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that US elites including Wilson, Thomas Lamont, etc wanted to destroy the Tsar and then Kerensky and make Russia into a lab and communist country which would be a testament to the validity of Edward House's Administrator Phillip Dru and Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward. No one ever lays it out, but there is not a single mainstream history book on this era that even comes close to explaining the discrepancies, missing info, and just absurd justifications for why this horrific tragedy happened. If any of you have the time, I'd recommend reading all the books above I listed as well as Grove's wonderful McMeekin rec (that is a phenomenal book to start with)
This was a great piece esp for people (me) who don’t know abt Russian history. Thank you for writing!