From the archives: General Wrangel's final letter to General Denikin
This is great stuff
This article is part of an ongoing series on the very relevant today but sadly ignored Russian Civil War (1917-1921). For earlier articles in this series, see General Wrangel asks: What’s in a name? and Two Intelligence Reports from the American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1919. Please consider becoming a paid subscriber to support my work. I’m literally begging you. I know you can’t see me right now but I’m crying because you won’t give me $5 a month to flood your inbox with the wonders of history. Paid subs also get access to exclusive articles and the podcast. Every subscription is a big help to me. Please.
The Russian Civil War was a mess. To make a long story short, Russia’s conservative Czar was overthrown and replaced by a weak liberal parliament. The liberal parliment was overthrown by communists (known as the Bolsheviks) just a few months later. This second revolution gradually spiraled into civil war as the communists began to kill more and more of their political enemies and run the country into the ground.
Despite being just a small minority with few military experts, the communists ended up winning the massive conflict that followed. A large part of the problem was leadership. The “White Army,” a term used to describe the loose and largely uncoordinated military formations that opposed the communists, suffered from incompetence and indecision at the highest levels. Very capable White generals like Pyotr Wrangel or Nikolai Yudenich were hamstrung by political operators because of their conservative political views or simply because of their effectiveness. Although many factions in and outside of Russia wanted the Bolsheviks gone, few wanted the Russian Empire to return to its early status as a powerful Imperial monarchy.
Leading the largest and most powerful grouping of the White Army during the Russian Civil War was General Anton Denikin, who commanded the “Armed Forces of South Russia.” Denikin had a very good reputation before the Russian Civil War, and was promoted to Commander-and-Chief after the universally respected pre-war head of the Russian military, General Lavr Kornilov, was killed in action during an early battle against the communists.
Despite some early victories, it quickly became apparent that Denikin was out of his depth. He was unable to maintain control of his own forces. Looting, graft, and general disorganization became commonplace. Denikin did not have the political or social skills required to navigate the many diplomatic and cultural issues facing a faction leader in a civil war in a massive empire with dozens of different ethnic and national groups. He was also unwilling to work with other high-level White Army leaders, fearing that their competing authority would undermine his own.
In a move that likely caused the White Army to lose the war, Denikin failed to assist the Siberian White Army of Admiral Kolchak (who on paper was the Supreme Ruler of Russia, but had a weaker military force than Denikin) at a critical moment. Denikin had the opportunity to unite with Kolchak’s forces by capturing the strategically important fortress-city Tsaritsyn (later renamed Stalingrad, the site of an important WW2 battle). This move would have taken the pressure off of Kolchak’s forces (who were being attacked hard while Denikin was not) and allowed the two White Armies to merge into one single massive front that the communists likely wouldn’t have been able to stop. However, if a united front was created, then Denikin would not have been in charge anymore: Kolchak officially outranked him.
Instead of helping Kolchak’s men, Denikin chose instead to delay capturing Tsaritsyn in order to prepare for a risky unsupported attack on Moscow. Capturing Moscow would have ended the war and made Denikin the undisputed hero of Russia. Denikin’s forces, led by General Wrangel, eventually captured Tsaritsyn but by then it was too late. Without help from Denikin’s army, Kolchak’s men were crushed and Kolchak himself was captured and executed. Furthermore, the Imperial gold reserves, that had been held by Kolchak and were used to obtain foreign loans for the Whites, fell into the hands of the Bolsheviks. The defeat of Kolchak’s army allowed the communists to turn their full attention to Denikin’s attack on Moscow, which failed soon after.
Denikin suffered a mental breakdown upon seeing his hopes of ending the war quickly collapse. He did not bother to organize a proper retreat, and as a result thousands of lives and literal tons of much-needed war material were lost. As criticism of Denikin grew, Denikin surrounded himself with sycophants and people whose loyalty he thought he could count on. Denikin was a political liberal, and had always been at odds with the conservative and monarchist officers who made up most of the White Army. He elevated other liberals to major roles and they set about persecuting conservative officers suspected of being a threat to Denikin’s power.
The officer who was the target of most of Denikin’s paranoia was General Wrangel. Wrangel was widely regarded as the most competent and popular general in the White Army. He had publicly warned Denikin against making the mistakes that had just led to disaster. Furthermore, Wrangel was also vocal about the efforts by members of Denikin’s staff to intentionally deprive the troops under Wrangel’s command of critical supplies in an effort to undermine Wrangel’s status. When Russians criticized Denikin’s performance, they often suggested that Wrangel be appointed in his place.
Tensions between Denikin and Wrangel, who had once been friends, continued to mount until eventually Denikin ordered that Wrangel be exiled from the country on pain of death. After receiving Denikin’s order, Wrangel stated in his memoirs that:
I wrote Denikin a letter. Written as it was in anger, it contained personal allusions here and there, but it gave an accurate history of our misunderstandings. I recalled to him, quoting documentary evidence, the many occasions on which I had warned him of the danger of his irresolute policy and the inevitable consequences of his faulty strategy. I had more than once extricated him from the morass into which his unfortunate opinions had landed him. I wrote that if catastrophe was upon us today, it was not I but he who was the sole culprit. Since I had left the service, I was no longer constrained to obey him, and he was powerless to force me to do so; but nevertheless, since he imagined that my presence would prevent him from accomplishing his work, I consented to leave Russia of my own free will.
This paragraph in Wrangel’s memoirs is all well and good, but for a long time the actual letter to Denikin (which was 15 pages long) was lost. However, an intrepid Twitter user (please follow him) managed to track down the full letter, which was translated into English by members of the British Military Mission during the Russian Civil War after it was first shared. The full letter is transcribed below. It’s an extremely detailed and interesting account of the Russian Civil War, along with lots of personal analysis of Denikin from one of the men who understood him best. Most interesting to me was the value system Wrangel displayed, he is very specific about how his service is voluntary and loyalty absolute. Wrangel came from a Baltic German family and this sort of medieval honor code was always at the top of his mind. Denikin never forgave Wrangel for writing this letter, and even in exile after the war’s end Denikin regularly attacked and slandered Wrangel and Wrangel’s associates.
I’ve transcribed the full text of the letter below. To enhance readability, certain spelling errors have been corrected and Britishisms have been changed to American English. As with all obscure primary sources, I really do encourage you to download copies of the original here. Important documents disappear all the time, it’s critical for copies to be as widespread as possible so that history never becomes truly “lost.”
I hope you enjoy!
General-Lieutenant Baron Wrangel
February 15th, 1920
100 Sebastopol
TO HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL A. I. DENIKIN
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the South of RUSSIA
MOST HONOURED SIR ANTON IVANOVITCH
The English Admiral SEYMOUR has informed me in the name of the Head of the English Mission attached to the Armed Forces of the South of RUSSIA, General HOLMAN, of your demand that I should quit the limits of RUSSIA, the alleged reason being, that my name is the center around which gather all who are dissatisfied with you.
Admiral SEYMOUR offers me to leave for abroad on an English vessel. A year and a half ago I joined the Volunteer Army and placed myself voluntarily under your orders, seeing in you an honest soldier, ready to sacrifice his personal welfare for that of his country, and to lay down his life for the salvation of RUSSIA.
I fought for 18 months in the ranks of the Armed Forces of the South of RUSSIA, invariably leading my troops to victory, and more than once saved the general situation in moments of grave danger.
My Army freed the Northern Caucasus from the Bolsheviks.
On the 6th of January 1919, on the conference that took place at the “Mineral Waters”, I offered to throw this army on the front of Tsaritsyn [note, after the Russian Civil War, the city of Tsaritsyn was renamed “Stalingrad.” Today it is called “Volgograd.”] in order to lend help and assistance to Admiral KOLCHAK, who was at that time advancing victoriously towards the Volga. My offer was rejected and the Army was thrown on the Reservoir of the Don, where it fought until May under the command of General YOUZEFOVITCH, who replaced me during my illness.
In April, as soon as I had recovered, I took the command of the Army, and on the 4th of April I sent you a report, (82), pointing out once more to the necessity of choosing the direction of Tsaritsyn as chief operation-line, and warning you that in the opposite case “the enemy would march on us from Tsaritsyn and threaten our base”…
My predictions were fulfilled to the letter. In the middle of April the enemy forced the Manych, appearing in the rear of the Volunteer Army, and advanced as far as 12 verstes from Bataisk. In face of this formidable danger, our troops, consisting chiefly of cavalry, were thrown in that direction, and you took the lead of them in person. The enemy was driven back beyond the Manych, but all our attempts to force the river failed. On the 4th of May you invited me to unite the troops of the Manych group under my orders and on the 8th of May, having defeated the 10th Army of the Reds at the Velikokniajeskaia, I drove it towards Tsaritsyn. At the same time there was a turn for the better in the Reservoir of the Don and General MAI-MAIEVSKY advanced rapidly to the North. On the 17th I occupied Tsaritsyn and moved upwards along the Volga. Simultaneously, the Volunteer Army occupied Charkoff.
The fortune of war seemed to smile on you, your glory and renown grew…. Ambitious dreams filled your heart…. Your written order about your subordination to Admiral KOLCHAK seemed to prove the contrary. History will show to what extent it was voluntary…. You wrote that “history will show to what extent it was voluntary…. You wrote that “devoting your life to the service of your ardently beloved country”, “putting its welfare above everything else in the world”, you “place yourself under the orders of Admiral KOLCHAK”. But it was not your life that you sacrificed in this case, only your power and highest authority
Is then, submission to another, in the name of your country’s welfare, a sacrifice for an honest son of that country?.... Yet, intoxicated as you were by your recent successes, you were hardly capable of such a sacrifice.
Admiral KOLCHAK, left to his own devices, was crushed by the enemy and commenced his retreat to the East. Vainly did the Army of the Caucasus endeavor to lend assistance to his troops. Thoroughly tired out by its march through waterless steppes, drained to the core and but feebly supplied, it was yet further weakened by constantly sending out detachments to the front of the Volunteer Army, which was marching on Moscow, hardly meeting with any resistance on its way.
In the middle of July I succeeded at last in putting myself in contact with the Ural Cossacks, and in order to consolidate this connection, gave the order to throw the 2nd Kuban Division, commanded by General GOVOROUSHTCHENKO, in the direction of Kamyshin, on the left shore of the Volga.
The two following telegrams throw a sufficient light on the desire of the Commander and Chief to lend assistance to the Siberian Armies of the RULER OF RUSSIA, Admiral KOLCHAK:
[Gen. Romanovsky’s telegram to Gen. Wrangel]
1. TO THE COMMANDER OF THE CAUCASIAN ARMY:
Beg to inform me without delay what your motives are for throwing General GOVOROUSHTCHENKO’S troops on the left shore of the Volga. Sending out such a considerable detachment, in connection with the necessity of detaching the Tersky Division and the I Corps of Don Cossacks, which later must return to the Don, will have the effect of weakening the Army on the chief operation line. Taganrog. July 16th. 010276 ROMANOVSKY.
[Gen. Wrangel’s reply to Gen. Romanovsky]
2. Taganrog. General ROMANOVSKY. 010276. The order of throwing the troops of General GOVOROUSHTCHENKO on the left shore of the Volga was given with the object of joining without delay of the troops of the SUPREME RULER OF RUSSIA, and was based on the promise of incorporating the 1st Don Corps into the effective force of the Caucasian Army, and on the prospect of the arrival of the 2nd Plastoun Brigade, my being informed by wire of its march in the direction of the Caucasian Army. The retreat of the Ural Cossacks to the East, the decision of returning the Don Cossacks to their Army, and also that of leaving the 2nd Pastoun Brigade in the ranks of the Volunteer Army and the order to send there the Tersky Division, naturally change the situation to the core. Under such conditions it is not only impossible for me to throw over any troops on the left shore of the Volga, in the direction of Kamyshin, but I must also give up any activity in the direction of the North. The effective force of the army is such, that being given the order to act simultaneously on the direction of Astrachan and Saratov, I can only hold the latter under observation. Tsaritsyn. July 16th. 010549. WRANGEL.
The troops of Admiral KOLCHAK, treacherously abandoned by us to their fate, were defeated. The Orenburg Cossacks laid down their arms and a handful of Ural Cossacks alone still offered resistance to the enemy. Having thus finished with the Siberian armies, the enemy hurriedly amassed forces in the direction of Saratov, with the object of falling upon the enfeebled Caucasian Army, drive it back to the South and thus secure his communications on the Eastern front.
In a letter written on the 29th of July, I drew your attention to the difficult position in which my Army now found itself, and on the inevitable turn of the worse in our luck of war, due to our faulty strategy. Your answer ran thus: “If I listened to the advice of all my assistants, the Armed Forces of RUSSIA would not have achieved their present successes.” Alas, my predictions were once more fulfilled! Under the strokes dealt by the 10th, 2nd, 11th, and 4th Armies of the Reds, the Caucasian Army was driven back to the South, and although, thanks to the incomparable valor and to the fortified positions of Tsaritsyn, it defeated all four Armies of the enemy, yet it lost all possibility of undertaking a new advance. Having driven back my Army to the South, the enemy hurriedly amassed and centered considerable forces for covering Moscow, and attacked the Army of General MAI-MAIEVSKY, which, being stretched out on an enormous front, badly organized and deprived of reserves, was easily obliged to retreat. At the time when the Volunteer Army was advancing victoriously towards Moscow, and your ear caught the sound of the bells ringing in its churches and cathedrals, anxiety and fear had already crept into the hearts of more than one of your assistants. An Army brought up on arbitrariness, rapine and drunkenness, led by chiefs who depraved their troops by their bad example, -such an army was not capable of recreating RUSSIA.
Having a disorganized rear, without a single line of fortification or knot of resistance, retreating in localities where the population had learnt to hate it, the Volunteer Army, having once commenced this retreat, irresistibly rolled backwards. The enemy’s successes rose and the inefficiency of your strategy and of your politics became more manifest with every day. The Russian society commenced to see clear. Louder and louder grew the voices of those who demanded the replacement of certain chiefs, whose blamable behavior was evident to all, by others, whose names had remained unblemished amidst the general decline of morals. But the poison of ambition had entered your soul, and drunk with power, surrounded by dishonest flatterers, you thought more of safeguarding your power and authority, than of saving your country.
On the 17th of October, General ROMANOVSKY asked me by wire which forces I could detach from the Caucasian Army to lend assistance to the Volunteer Army. I wired back on the 18th of October, (03533), to say that “considering the small effective force of the cavalry divisions, 1 or 2 would not be of any serious and decisive use,” and offered to take a great decision, “to send 3 1/2 divisions out of the Army under my command”. As to the rest of the troops of the Army, considering their small effective force, I offered to unite them into one separate Corps, at the head of which I suggested leaving General Pokrovsky. The strategic measure which derived from this was clearly the necessity of uniting the 4th Don and the 3rd Cavalry Corps, the Tersky and the special Don divisions and the abovementioned 3 ½ Kuban divisions into one group and to place them under the lead of the Staff of the Caucasian Army. This measure was upheld by all three Commanders of the Armies, and amongst them General MAI-MAIEVSKY. But you foresaw, in this desire of the Chief Commanders and of the Society to see me at the head of the troops acting on the chief operation-line, a new danger for yourself.
Some time ago, after the occupation of Tsaritsyn, on the conference which was held at the time, when I and the Commander of my Staff, General JOUZEFOVITCH, suggested amassing a considerable amount of cavalry in the region of Charkoff, under my command, you had already expressed the supposition that “we wanted to be the first to enter Moscow.”… Now you saw, in the decline of the charm that surrounded your name, not your own faults, mistakes, and failings, but the instability of the crowd, which had found a new idol…
Two divisions only were taken from the Caucasian Army, and although later on, circumstances forced you to throw all 3 ½ divisions on the front of the chief operation-line time and opportunity were irretrievably lost and the troops, led into the battle little by little, were defeated in turn. On the 11th of November, in answer to my repeated insistencies, you wrote that after a detailed deliberation on the question, you had decided to desist from the grouping I had suggested, and 10 days after, on the 22nd, when the loss of Charkoff and the inevitable retreat from the Reservoir of the Don had become evident, you wired for me to arrive, “in order to receive a new nomination” “the commandment of the Volunteer Army, with all the cavalry under my orders.” It was too late to dream of any serious resistance on our part, the only feasible thing was to try and lead the Army out of danger and uniting it with the Army of the Don,- cover the line of Rostov. This was done, after a heavy side-march of 250 verstes.
As the Army neared Rostov, anxiety and displeasure grew. The Society and the Army were keenly aware of the reasons that had led to defeat and the reproaches addressed to the Commander-in-Chief grew louder every day. You felt your authority slipping out of your hands and your prestige fading with every hour. Clinging blindly to power, you sought around you treachery and revolt… On the 9th of December I sent you a report, pointing out to the reason of your unsucesses and to the necessity of urgent measures for the fortification of the right shore of the Don. Nothing was done, but in answer to my report came a wire addressed the Commanders of Armies, with the declaration that “certain of them take the liberty of giving me their advice in an inadmissible form”, and with the formal demand of “absolute submission”…
In the middle of December, in view of discussing a whole series of questions (the mobilization of the population and horses, the deployment of some of the Kuban detachments etc. etc.) with the generals SIDORIN and POKROVSKY, I begged them to arrive to Rostov for an interview with me. The telegram I had sent them was made known by me in a copy to General ROMANOVSKY. ON the following day I received your circular wire to all the Commanders of Armies, pointing out to the “inadmissibility” of my telegram and forbidding them to quit the limits of their Armies. You evidently meant to cut short, by such measures, the intrigue, existing in your imagination alone, of your nearest assistants.
On the 22nd of December the Volunteer Army was dissolved and I received the order to leave for the Caucasuses, where I was to organize the Tersky and Kuban Cavalry.
On my arrival to Ekaterinodar, I learnt that serval days before, General SHKOURO had been entrusted with a similar task, and was already on the Kuban. Later on you tried to deny this, and hinted that General SHKOURO had acted on his own behalf. Yet General SHHKOURO published a most definite declaration in the press, to the effect that he had been charged by you with this mission, and this declaration was not refuted by your Staff. Colonel GONTAREFF, of the General Staff, was attached to General SHKOURO, having been put at his disposal by General VIAZNITINOFF; two agents of the Intelligence Department were also attached to him. These agents, the brothers KARTASHEFF, specially spread all sorts of false reports against me amongst the Cossacks, trying to persuade them of my intention of making a “coup d'état” in the cause of monarchy and of my “German orientation”.
At the end of December General SHKOURO was appointed Commander of the Army of the Kuban, and, being unoccupied, I left for Novorossiysk. Some time before that, on the 25th of December, I had sent you a report, pointing out to the inevitable disorganization of the Kuban, and of the necessity of retaining New Russia and the Crimea, where the struggle could still be carried on. Rumors full of anxiety came from there, and these rumors joined to the fact of my being put aside and idle at a time when our country was in such distress, naturally caused much commotion amongst the public. Military chiefs, statesmen, and social leaders reportedly pointed out to you the necessity of availing yourself of my services, of using whatever forces and capabilities I possessed. They insisted on the act that New Russia and the Crimea being entirely independent seats of war, it was indispensable to divide the military commandment in these provinces. The English Commanding Forces were of the same opinion. But it was only when the loss of New Russia became evident to all, that you consented to appoint me to the point of assistant (for military affairs) to General SHILLING, and on the 28th of January I received a telegram from General ROMANOVSKY, informing me that “in view of the evacuation from New Russia and its occupation by the enemy” that the post of assistant to General Shilling will be left vacant”.
In Novorossiysk a most unworthy watch was kept over me; the names of all those who visited me and the time and date of their visit, were published in the official reports of the Intelligence Department of your Staff, and the General-Quarter master of your Staff took the liberty of talking aloud, before several officers, about an “interior front in Novorossiysk, at the head of which stood Baron WRANGEL”…
Persistent rumors about my intention of making a “coup d’état” spread by your Staff, reached abroad. Mr. MACK-KINDER, recently arrived from England on a special mission, visited me in Novorossiysk, and informed me that he had received a wire from his Government inquiring about this “coup d'état”. Mr. MACK-KINDER supposed that these rumor arose from the fact of your hostility against me, which was already well known in RUSSIA and abroad, and begged me, if possible, to tell him the entire truth on the subjected. I answered that “I could not dream of revolting against a chief under whose orders I had voluntarily placed myself” and authorized him to tell his Government , that my word of honor and all of my former military service were guarantee enough of the truth of what I was saying”. In a report which I sent you on the 31st of December, (85), I informed you in detail of my conversation with Mr. MACK-KINDER, putting into your possession a document which ought to have dispelled all your fears…. But you did not even trouble to answer me.
Being deprived of all possibility of serving my country as best I could, having lost all faith in the Chief under whose orders I had placed myself at the commencement of this struggle, and the very esteem in which I had hitherto held him, I sent my resignation and left Novorossiysk for the Crimea for a prolonged “rest”. My arrival to Sebastopol coincided with the adventure of Captain ORLOFF, an adventure in itself silly and pernicious, but which called forth a storm of passions, the reasons of it being solely this—it was passed under the flag of a struggle with the disorganization of the rear and the fortification of the front”. The Army and Society, worn out by anarchy, having lost all faith in the principles proclaimed by the authorities, deeply revolted by the criminal actions of their representatives, saw in this adventure the means and possibility of changing the existing order of things. They saw in me the man who could give them what they were longing for. Captain ORLOFF proclaimed loudly that I was the only chief to whom he would submit. General SHILLING, who had arrived to Sebastopol after the fall of Odessa, and saw clear in the situation, begged you himself to appoint me in his place. The Commander of the Fleet and your Help and Assistant, General LOUKOMSKY, supported his petition. A whole series of social groups, of representatives of the nations of the Crimea, did the same. The representatives of the Allied Powers also insisted upon it. But all was in vain. Clinging to the power and authority which were slipping out of your hands, you chose the dangerous path of compromises, and giving way to the “samostiiniki” [Cossack nationalists/separatists who opposed an organized front], you decided to declare war to your assistants, whom you suspected of preparing a “coup d'état”.
On the 8th of February, you issued an order, in which you condemned Captain ORLOFF’s adventure, at the head of which stood “men who had begun an unworthy political game”, and invited General SHILLING to arrest those who were guilty, “whatever high position they might occupy”. Simultaneously, another order was issued, by which I and the ex-Commander of the Staff of my Army, General SHATILOFF, also General LOUKOMSKY and Admiral NENIOUKOFF, who had interceded on behalf of my nomination to the post of Commander of the Crimea, were dismissed from service. Both orders appeared in the Crimea on the 10th of February whilst two days before my telegram to Captain ORLOFF appeared in the press, persuading him “as an old officer who had given up 20 years of his life to his country, to submit, in the name of its welfare, to his chiefs.” … There was no need to guess the name of the man “who had begun an unworthy political game”… it was on everybody’s lips.
Now you invite me to leave RUSSIA. This order was transmitted to me through the medium of the English Commanding Forces, and can therefore, be commented as issuing from them, in relation to my “German orientation” so zealously talked about by your agents. Your Staff gave the same explanation of your refusal to name me to the post of the Commander of the Crimea, hinting at the protest on the part of the English Representatives of the Allied Powers.
After my dismissal from service, I consider myself free from any engagements towards you and your order by no means binding or obligatory. You have no means or possibility whatever of forcing me to obey. Notwithstanding this, I resolve to leave Russia, smothering the pain in my heart.
The struggle you commenced so valorously and have lost so unworthily, is coming to an end. Hundreds and thousands of the best sons of Russia, innocent of your mistakes, have been involved in it.
Their salvation and the salvation of their families depend on the help of our Allies, who have promised you this help.
I leave you to end this task you have undertaken, and if my residence in this country can in any way harm those who have put their trust in you, I leave RUSSIA without a moment’s hesitation.
BARON PYOTR WRANGEL.
Off topic, but you’re linked here in the third to last paragraph https://www.aporiamagazine.com/p/lawfare-vs-revolutionaries